The Futility of Nuclear Posturing

The ongoing conflicts in Iran and Ukraine serve as a stark reminder that, despite decades of investment and innovation, the United States’ and Russia’s nuclear arsenals remain fundamentally unsuitable for regional warfare. The world watches as two major powers struggle to achieve their objectives with these supposedly game-changing weapons, yet the limits of nuclear deterrence have not changed since the Cold War era.

Both nations continue to grapple with the same fundamental problem: how to use nuclear arms in a way that advances their interests without escalating into catastrophic proportions. The failure to answer this question is evident in the ongoing wars, where both sides have resorted to conventional tactics despite having access to thermonuclear options.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which essentially repurposed an outdated document rather than creating a new one, reflects a disturbing lack of critical thinking about the role of nuclear arms in modern warfare. The review’s authors failed to acknowledge that their predecessors’ experiments with nuclear deterrence had already produced a wealth of knowledge on this subject.

During the Cold War, American strategists repeatedly encountered roadblocks when trying to integrate nuclear capabilities into regional conflicts. Plans for using nukes in Korea and Vietnam were rejected by Presidents Truman and Johnson due to concerns about escalation and the risks of triggering war with the Soviet Union. Even Richard Nixon’s administration was unable to devise a viable plan for using nuclear arms against North Korea without causing massive destruction.

The history of nuclear deterrence is replete with examples of policymakers attempting to use these weapons in regional conflicts, only to be thwarted by their own fears and uncertainties. Elbridge Colby’s 2013 advocacy for keeping thermonuclear options on the table as a response to cyberattacks is a prime example of this shortsightedness.

The current conflicts serve as a stark reminder that, despite advancements in technology and doctrine, the fundamental nature of nuclear arms has not changed. Threatening to use nukes may be easy, but figuring out where and how to use one remains just as difficult today as it was during the Cold War.

Policymakers would do well to revisit the strategic nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. This remarkable example of deterrence in action kept the peace among the nuclear-armed powers for decades, even when proxy wars and local conflicts raged on other fronts. The key takeaway from this experience is that nuclear arms are best suited for maintaining stability at a global level, rather than being employed as instruments of war.

In light of these lessons, it’s imperative that policymakers reassess their approaches to nuclear deterrence and regional warfare. Rather than continuing down the path of posturing and half-measures, they should work towards developing new strategies that acknowledge the limitations of nuclear arms in modern conflicts. Only by doing so can we hope to avoid the catastrophic consequences of another round of failed nuclear posturing.